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Aristotle earns the distinction of having put forward the first comprehen-
sive philosophical theory of justice. After the end of the antique world, St.
Thomas Aquinas was the first philosopher and theologian to return to
Aristotle’s theory of the just. Not only did he do so with the requisite
systematic precision; he also developed a new philosophical interpretation
of justice. In the present article I shall outline, with the brevity expected of
me here, the fundamentals of Aristotle’s theory of justice. This will be
followed by a summary of the core aspects of Aquinas’s notion of justice,
whose grounding in normative reason will be identified in Aquinas’s trea-
tise on law and political theory, and explicated accordingly.
I.
Aristotle’s theory of justice had its precursors; there were interpretations of
the just in Greek literature, rhetoric, and politics, as well as philosophy, to
which Aristotle also makes explicit reference on a number of occasions.
Aristotle, however, is the first to formulate a comprehensive theory of justice.
To understand Aristotle’s theory, we must turn to Book 5 of the Nicomachean
Ethics.1 Here, Aristotle first distinguishes between a type of justice that he
interprets as “complete” and at the same time as “complete virtue” or “virtue
entire,” and a type of justice which is to be understood as “part of virtue.”
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics [EN], Book 5, 1129a3–1138b15.
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This notion of justice as a particular virtue is further broken down by
Aristotle into the categories that became common in the later interpretative
tradition of “distributive justice” (iustitia distributiva),  and “rectificatory
justice,” which only later was termed iustitia commutativa, that is, “commuta-
tive justice.” The latter occurs either in the form of justice in the voluntary
exchange of goods and services, and thus represents the sphere of civil law,
or in the form of involuntary creation of just conditions through criminal
law, which includes the institution of the judge. These conceptual distinc-
tions within the notion of justice as a particular virtue possess systematic
clarity, which is why they also had a sustained impact on the later jurispru-
dential and legal debates on the nature of justice.
Having said this, the reader’s powers of comprehension are somewhat
taxed by Aristotle’s assertion that justice is also “complete virtue” or “virtue
entire.” In Book 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics, it is unclear how Aristotle might
relate the general virtue of justice to the particular virtues of justice and the
other ethical  virtues. It is widely accepted that the concepts of iustitia
universalis or iustitia generalis can be traced back within the Aristotelian
tradition to the claim  that justice  should be understood  as “complete
virtue.” Günther Bien has rightly noted that Aristotle does not distinguish
between a general and a particular “justice”; rather, he asserts that “justice”
should be considered on the one hand as “virtue in the fullest sense” or as
“complete virtue,” yet on the other hand as merely a part of virtue.2 Seen in
this context, the later discourse incorporating the categories of a general
justice and a particular justice is misleading, at least with respect to the
conceptual categories introduced by Aristotle. Inferences can also be drawn
from such discourse that are very difficult indeed to reconcile with Aris-
totle’s proposal.
Consequently, Aristotle’s interpretation of justice as an ethical virtue is
of fundamental importance for his theory of justice. It was developed later
than the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine of the so-called four cardinal
virtues. When introducing the four cardinal virtues in The Republic for
instance, Plato assigns the highest status to justice: While the virtues of
wisdom, courage, and temperance are assigned to the three principles of
the soul, and to the three hierarchically stratified classes acting in the ideal
state, the virtue of justice enjoys the highest status because it underpins the
other virtues; yet Plato defines “justice” per se only in very general terms as
“doing one’s own business and not being a busybody.”3 Aristotle evidently
does not share this understanding of the concept of justice although he
does, as we have seen, adhere for his own part to a definition of justice as
the most complete, in other words as the supreme virtue. “Justice” as a
virtue is a disposition to act justly or a habit (a hexis or a habitus) of so doing
2. Günther Bien, Gerechtigkeit bei Aristoteles, in O. Höffe (Hg.), Aristoteles—Die
Nikomachische Ethik, Klassiker Auslegen, Band 2 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), p.
139.
3. Plato, The Republic IV, 427e.
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which a person does not already posses as a natural attribute, but must first
of all acquire. Yet the virtue of justice is “complete” because, as Aristotle
says, “he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but
toward his neighbor also.”4
So  “justice” means “complete virtue  in  the  fullest sense”  when its
referent is construed as encompassing not only a potential or disposition to
act justly, but also the exercise of virtue temporalized in the historic per-
formance of just actions towards other persons. Otfried Höffe has pointed
out that Aristotle appears already to assign to justice as a general virtue the
nature of a required virtuous act on which “another” holds a (legitimate)
claim.5 In doing so, however, Höffe assumes that the description of justice
as “another’s good” that Aristotle uses in this context possesses obligatory
force.6 Aristotle’s text does not bear out this assumption unequivocally;
Höffe’s ascription of obligatory force probably has its origin in traditional
readings of Aristotle that construe his ethics in the light of later Stoic,
Thomist, or Kantian moral philosophy.
It is indisputable that the reference to “another’s good” as the end of
the  virtue of justice emphasizes the aspect of benefit to another, thus
introducing to the general virtue of justice a dimension of “objective”
normativity. This is also reflected in Aristotle’s terminology: The general or
“objective” normative end of acts motivated by the virtue of justice, that is,
the telos of justice as a virtue, is termed by Aristotle “the just,” rendered
normative on intersubjective grounds. Having said that, Aristotle considers
it easier to define the “just” once the contours of its contrary, the “unjust,”
have been identified more precisely. As in many other texts, Aristotle ap-
proaches the conceptual definition he is seeking by first observing common
everyday parlance and usage.7 Thus according to Aristotle, generally speak-
ing we describe as unjust persons first of all the “lawless,” secondly the
“grasping,” and thirdly the “unfair.” From this usage, Aristotle infers his
definition of the “just” as the intentional end of actions motivated by the
general virtue of justice: “The just, then, is the lawful and the fair, the unjust
the unlawful and the unfair.”8 The general virtue of justice is thus to be
defined as the capacity and the will to do the just, (the lawful and the fair)9
whereas its contrary, the vice of injustice, is to be understood as a habit by
force of which a person does the unjust (the unlawful and the unfair, and
intenionally so.)10 In equating the just with the lawful and the fair, Aristotle
further concludes that “all lawful acts are in a sense just acts,” in which
context his basic definition of “lawful acts” is acts that are “laid down by the
legislative art.” In his Politics, Aristotle goes so far as to describe each
4. EN, 1129b32–34.
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individual item of legislation as “just,” insofar as it complies with and is
conducive to the respective constitution and its end.11
Aristotle makes it clear that what is thus declared to be “just,” and as
such also to be the end of endeavors directed toward justice, not arbitrary.
Aristotle points out that while the laws of the state may relate to anything,
their aim is to support the end of the respective political order: either to
foster the common good of a political community or to increase benefits
for the aristocracy or benefits for the respective monarch. Evidently, Aris-
totle is referring here to the doctrine set out in Book 5 of Politics on the
various state constitutions of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy.
Whereas Aristotle defines justice in Book 1 of Politics as an element of the
state and judicial procedure as the power to judge what is “just” in specific
instances,12 in the context of his theory of justice in Book 5 of Nicomachean
Ethics he defines the just, which constitutes the end of acts motivated by the
virtue of justice, as that which produces and preserves happiness and its
components for the political society, or sections thereof.13
When defining the aim of the general virtue of justice, the “just,”
Aristotle without a doubt accords priority to the “lawful” over the “fair.”
According to Aristotle, the “fair” is to the “lawful” as a part is to the whole.14
This ascribed priority is cognate with the primacy of the general virtue of
justice, which embraces the entire sphere of a person’s attitudes toward
other people, whereas the particular virtue of justice relates only to specific
instances of acts of virtue. The salient examples of this are voluntary trans-
actions, the distribution of “honor or money or the other things” in the
political society, and criminal jurisdiction.15 In this context, the notion of
the “fair”—equated by Aristotle with the “equal”—is constantly in play. This
results in the definition of right or just, understood within the conceptual
framework of the particular virtue of justice, as the quantifiable “intermedi-
ate” between competing claims of the concerned persons, be it according
to the mathematical principle of arithmetic proportionality as in the case of
“rectificatory” or “commutative justice,” or be it in accordance with the
principle of geometric proportionality as in the case of “distributive justice.”
In subordinating the particular to the general virtue of justice, and
the criterion of the fair (or equal) to that of the lawful, Aristotle reaches
the crux of his theory of justice. He not only claims that all cases involving
the particular virtue of justice are in principle subject to legal regulation;
he also defines the just, which is the quintessential aim of the general
virtue of justice, solely in terms of its formal legality and its function. The
latter consists in serving the particular political society and its ends, re-
gardless of whether that means an autocracy, aristocratic rule, or rule by
11. Cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1301a17–1316b26.
12. Aristotle, Politics, 1253a35ff.




the demos or “populace.” Aristotle does not infer from the general virtue
of justice any normative force attached to the system of the “just.” Apart
from defining the just in terms of its formal legality and its function of
serving the well-being of the respective form of rule, Aristotle does not
specify any further aspects that might justify the distinction between “le-
gality” and “legitimacy,” a constitutive distinction in later conceptions of
the just. Although it performs the function of linking all the individual
virtues with the sphere of the political and the legal, the general virtue of
justice does not provide any normative criterion on which Aristotle might
base a distinction between “legality” and “legitimacy.” Aristotle’s particular
virtue of justice does contain an element, albeit a weak one, of the “rea-
sonable” normativity of the just, that is, the normativity of the proportion-
ately equal. Yet due to its subordination to the general virtue of justice
“like a part to the whole,” it does not acquire any general normativity for
the legal system as a whole; it remains particular, related to particular cases
negotiated in the specific context of civil and criminal law. Neither does
the concept of the “just by nature” as opposed to the law of the state
positively defined “by human enactment,” which Aristotle introduces in
Chapter 10 of Book 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics, contain any indication of
a normative account of the just.16 Because unlike the natural phenomenon
of fire, which burns in the same way no matter where, the “just by nature”
is experienced only subjectively and is subjectively variable, but does not
constitute a norm or a rule that might operate as a general yardstick for
critique of a legal or constitutional system.
II.
In the second part of his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas puts forward an analysis
of the concepts of “right” and “justice.”17 This follows his treatment of the
theological virtues of “faith, hope, and charity,” and can be considered the
most sophisticated discussion of the concept of justice in the thirteenth
century. Aquinas’s exposition is evidently strongly influenced by the prece-
dents set by Aristotle in Book 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Yet Aquinas does not
confine himself to providing a commentary on Aristotle’s text; on the con-
trary, he systematically develops Aristotle’s contribution to the philosophical
analysis of the notion of justice, and in so doing makes a key contribution to
the formulation of a new paradigm—a normative theory of justice.
As the works of O. Lottin on the development of practical philosophy
in the Middle Ages have shown, a fresh debate on the issue of justice had
16. EN, 1134b18–1135a5.
17. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae [ST] II–II, q.57 and q.58 ff.; see also
from the perspective of legal history: John Finnis, Aquinas, Moral, Political, and Legal
Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), esp. pp. 132–218.
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already commenced in the twelfth century prior to, and therefore inde-
pendently of, the Latin reception of Aristotle’s texts of practical philoso-
phy.18 Characteristic of the earlier medieval treatment of justice was the
establishment of a link between the doctrine of the cardinal virtues formu-
lated by classical philosophy, coupled with Cicero’s interpretation of justice,
and the general biblical discourse of God’s justice and the New Testament
message of the justification of humankind.19 This approach focused less on
the forensic aspect of the notion of justice, and more on the soteriological
issue of justification. The Venerable Bede, for instance, speaks of the virtue
of justice as an attitude that leads people to act morally, but incorporates
this into a theological panorama of the human being in which he systemati-
cally interprets the four cardinal virtues in terms of the three theological
virtues of “faith, hope, and charity.”20 Rabanus Maurus employs the meta-
phor of the Holy Cross, to whose four points he assigns the cardinal virtues
in expression of the fact that the force of God’s soteriological agency is also
at work in the ethical virtues.21
In the twelfth century, it is Peter Abelard, who accords inherent sig-
nificance to the virtue of justice independently of the theological virtues,
for instance, in his reception of the notion of justice taken from Cicero’s
Stoic ethics, contained in his Dialogus inter Philosophum, Judaeum et Chris-
tianum.22 In contrast to earlier interpretations of justice, Abelard stresses
that justice, like the other virtues, may only be sought as an end in itself,
and not as a means to another end. This marks the formulation of the
philosophically and theologically founded insight that human morality is
an end in itself, and may not simply be interpreted as a path to salvation.
As Abelard emphasizes, this does not exclude the notion of a person who
acts morally being rewarded. What in Abelard’s view is crucial, however,
is that a person only acts truly morally when s/he acts solely in pursuit
of  virtue as an end in itself, without any  intention of seeking reward.
According to Abelard, happiness or everlasting bliss is bestowed on a per-
son as a reward for a life lived in the spirit of justice as a virtue, subject
to the proviso that the individual has firmly intended to be just, that is,
to possess the virtue of justice as an end in itself and not as a means to
another end.23 In developing this argument, Abelard draws on a consti-
tutive distinction in ethical reflection, which crops up again, for instance,
18. O. Lottin, “Le concept de justice chez les théologiens du moyen âge avant
l’introduction d’Aristote,” Revue Thomiste (1938): 511–21; Lottin, Psychologie et morale
aux XII et XIII siècle (Gembloux/Louvain, 1942–1960).
19. Cf. Cicero, De officiis I, (7) 20, hg. v. K. Büchner (Munich/Zurich: Artemis
Verlag, 1987), p. 19.
20. Cf. Beda Venerabilis, De tabernaculo III, 14, in: Patrologia Latina 91, 772.
21. Rabanus Maurus, De laudibus crucis II, 6, in: Patrologia Latina 107, 271.
22. Petrus Abaelardus, Dialogus inter Philosophum, Judaeum et Christianum, ed. R.
Thomas (Stuttgart/Bad Cannstadt: Fromman Holzboog Verlag, 1970).
23. Abaelardus, Dialogus, 105 f and 117–25.
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in Kant’s distinction between acting in accordance with what duty com-
mands, and acting/doing from duty.24 In the wake of this recognition of
the inherent value of the moral, and especially the moral frame of mind
or intent, as introduced by Abelard and his school, a bifurcation emerges
between the specifically theological, and the philosophical ethical treat-
ment of the theme of justice. The assumption cannot be dismissed that
this development is also a result of the emergence of a sphere of “earthly
justice,” which Harold Berman’s study on the emergence of modern legal
systems has interpreted as an implication of, and response to, the Gre-
gorian reforms of the eleventh century.25
Aquinas too, like Aristotle before him, sees justice as an ethical virtue.
A habit of the individual  who possesses it, it  is  at the same time  the
“principle of a good act” at work within him/her.26 But because in Aqui-
nas’s view an act gains the moral quality of the good “through attaining
the rule of reason, which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated,”
the role of moral virtue can be characterized more precisely in this sense
of the requisite attainment of the rule of practical reason with reference
to the principle directing an agent’s actions.27 Aquinas assigns this task to
the virtue of justice. The task is to “regulate” or “direct” a person’s external
actions in compliance with reason, where those actions relate to other
persons. As Aquinas already  explains in q.57, a.1, which is devoted to
“right” (ius), this regulatory function of the virtue of justice consists in
“adjusting” or bringing about “some kind of equality” (aequalitas quaedam)
between the agents and the objects involved in the external exchange.28
Thus Aquinas’s basic definition of the role of justice as one of regulation
to establish right consists in a directive attitude or habit on the part of
intersubjective agents, directing them to perform acts of “right justice” in
compliance with their recognition of the criterion of equality or adjust-
ment. Aquinas thus makes unmistakably clear that for him, unlike for
Aristotle, the fundamental provisions of the legal system are not simply
already given on the basis of the respective form of rule or political con-
24. Cf. I. Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysis of Morals, Trans. James W.
Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), BA 8. Concerning
a comparison between the ethics of Abelard and Kant, see my essay “Modern
Aspects of Peter Abelard’s Philosophical Ethics,” The Modern Schoolman 72 (1995):
213–32.
25. H. J. Berman, Recht und Revolution. Die Bildung der westlichen Rechtstradition
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1991).
26. Cf. ST, II–II, a.58, a.1: “Omnis virtus sit habitus qui est principium boni
actus.”
27. ST II–II, q.58, a.3: “Actus enim hominis bonus redditur ex hoc quod
attingit regulam rationis, secundum quam humani actus rectificantur.”
28. ST II–II, q.57, a.1: “Sic igitur justum dicitur aliquid, quasi habens rectitu-
dinem justitiae, ad quod terminatur actio justitiae . . . Et propter hoc specialiter
justitiae prae aliis virtutibus determinatur secundum se objectum quod vocatur
justum. Et hoc quidem est jus.”
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stitution, but must first of all proceed from the requisite human habit of
justice and practical reason.29
Aquinas’s account of right grounded in normative reason corresponds
to his reading of the general virtue of justice. Here too, Aquinas proposes
a normative rational foundation, circumventing the lack of clarity in Aris-
totle’s notion of the general virtue of justice. The innovative intention
guiding Aquinas’s reception of Aristotle’s theory of justice becomes clear in
the middle of q.58. In q.58, a.1 Aquinas first picks up on the famous
definition of justice going back to Ulpian’s Digest, and proceeds to link this
with the Aristotelian concept of virtue.30 And thus at the end of this Article,
he defines “justice” as a “habit whereby a man renders to each one his due
by a constant and perpetual will.”31 In this definition of justice, however,
Aquinas is already aiming at the notion of the particular virtue of justice and
the attitudes it represents of a partially distributive, and partially rectifica-
tory or commutative justice subject to the guiding principle of proportion-
ate equality. Aristotle had already assigned to this particular virtue of justice
a certain degree of contextual normativity, and Aquinas shares this view. But
he does so on the basis of modified overall concept of justice, which he puts
forward in q.58, a.2–6. In q.57, a.1 Aquinas had already pointed out that the
Latin noun denoting justice (iustitia) by virtue of its etymology already
implied the task of “ad-just-ment.” This adjustment takes place in relation
to another or others (ad alterum). To be more precise, as already indicated
the task of the virtue of justice viewed from a general perspective is to rectify
human acts toward others (actus humanos rectificare).32 Justice performs this
task by regulating interpersonal actions and the external circumstances
affecting those interpersonal actions. Aquinas identifies as the subject of the
virtue of justice the human will (voluntas), which is assigned to practical
reason, and not to the senses, and hence is to be understood as the rational
part of the appetite.33 It is therefore human practical reason itself, as whose
habit the virtue of justice performs, directing the external and interper-
sonal acts toward the just.34 The general virtue of justice performs this task
primarily by directing all other ethically relevant human virtues toward the
comprehensive objective of the common good (bonum commune). This is the
point at which “the general virtue” (virtus generalis) of justice for the first time
29. In this context see also Aquinas’s further discussion of natural law (ius
naturale) in q.57, a.2, which in view of Aquinas’s grounding of right in normative
reason differs from the concept of the “just by nature” in Book 5 of the Nicomachean
Ethics; see fn.16.
30. Cf. ST II–II, q.58, a.1: “Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum
unicuique tribuens.”
31. ST II–II, q.58, a.1 “Justitae est habitus secundum quam aliquis constanti et
perpetua voluntate ius suum unicuique tribuit.”
32. ST II–II, q.58, a.2.
33. ST II–II, q.58, a.4.
34. ST II–II, q.58, a.4 “Quia apprehensio sensitiva non se extendit ad hoc quod
considerare possit proportionem unius ad alterum, sed hoc est proprium rationis.”
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proves to be just that; the “general virtue,” as which justice now occurs, can
only perform its assigned task of directing all virtues and external acts
toward the common good, as required by practical reason, by making use
of “laws” (leges).35 This is because, as Aquinas had already explained in ST
I–II, q.90, the “chief and main concern of law” is to direct toward the
common good.36 He therefore  also  refers to  the general virtue  under
discussion as “legal justice” (justitia legalis),37 whereby: “man is in harmony
with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.”38
At this point, the fundamental distinction between the arguments of
Aquinas and those of Aristotle becomes evident. Aristotle does not un-
derstand the “legal,” which he largely identifies as the goal of the general
virtue of justice, in terms of normative reason; rather, he equates it with
the de facto legal systems of states and their highly diverse ends. As such,
Aristotle does not assign to the general virtue of justice any normative
force founded in reason that would direct acts toward the idea of the
common good, and which would support a claim of universal normativity
for all polities.
Aquinas goes on to set out the reasons why legal justice can be termed
the  “general virtue.”  It does not,  for instance, constitute a  “genus” or
generic term into which, logically speaking, all the other virtues are sub-
sumed like “species” or specific terms. The general virtue of justice is rather
assigned a universal normative force, articulated by its directing all acts
motivated by any of the virtues toward the bonum commune as their most
all-embracing end. On the basis of this task, the virtue of legal justice is
assigned the position of the supreme ethical virtue, comparable in function
to the position occupied by the virtue of charity within the triad of theologi-
cal virtues faith, hope, and charity. As in the case of charity within the
theological virtues, the general virtue of justice also remains constitutionally
distinct from the other ethical virtues, which is why notwithstanding its
general or complete nature it is always at the same time a “special virtue”
(virtus specialis); this because it always seeks to achieve its proper end, that
is, the common good, via a special route, namely by utilizing laws.39 “Be-
sides” justice as a “general” and a “special virtue,” there is also, according to
Aquinas, justice as an individual or particular virtue (virtus particularis).40
Because just as Aquinas sees alongside legal justice, which directs man
immediately toward the common good, the other virtues such as temper-
ance and fortitude, he also sees in addition to legal justice directing norma-
tively toward the common good, a “particular justice” (iustitia particularis)
35. ST II–II, q.58, a.5.
36. Cf. ST I–II, q.90, a.3.
37. ST II–II, q.58, a.5.
38. 38. ST II–II, q.58, a.5 “Quia scilicet per eam homo concordat legi ordinanti
actus omnium virtutum in bonum commune.”
39. Q.58, a.6.
40. Q.58, a.7.
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“to direct man in his relations to other individuals.”41 The virtue of particu-
lar justice occurs in a plurality of forms, appropriate to the diversity of
relations among the persons interacting with one another as individuals: in
the form of distributive justice, commutative justice, or rectificatory justice
based on the verdict of a judge. Aquinas assigns both the general and
particular virtues of justice priority over the other ethical virtues. He assigns
priority to the general virtue of legal justice because through its orientation
toward the common good, it directs all the other virtues toward their end.
Whereas he assigns priority to the particular virtue of justice firstly because
it belongs to the will, the rational appetite that belongs to human practical
reason, and secondly because it regulates human actions toward other
individuals.42 In the light of this definition of tasks, and especially that of
particular justice,  the  ethical postulates  such  as the  call to  help those
suffering misery or unhappiness (subvenire miseris), and the call to exercise
compassion or generosity, are not inferences drawn from the human emo-
tion of sympathy, but consequences of the call for justice deduced by means
of practical reason.43
III.
The normative concept of a general virtue of justice founded in practical
human reason, which Aquinas also terms “legal justice,” does not occur for
the first time in that section of the Summa Theologiae devoted to the ethical
virtues. In the earlier Treatise on Law contained in the Prima Secundae,
Aquinas makes reference to his notion of justice, even though, as we have
already seen, he does not develop it systematically in the text of the Summa
until later.44 In q.90, Aquinas attempts to define the concept of law (lex) in
highly general terms, before proceeding to examine its theological, philoso-
phico-ethical, and legal applicability. Here, Aquinas sees “law” as nothing
other than “a kind of direction [or rule] and measure”45 for human activity,
in which connection he identifies (practical) reason as being the originat-
ing or first principle (primum principium) from which actions proceed, the
principle which “enacts” this rule as its foremost measure for action.46
Before Aquinas proceeds to draw distinctions between the ethical and legal
aspects of the notion of law, he assigns to the “Basic Law” of action “en-
acted” by reason the task of directing the individual toward the comprehen-
41. Q.58, a.7: “Oportet esse particularem quamdam justitiam, quae ordinet
hominem circa ea quae sunt ad alteram singularem personam.”
42. Cf. q.58, a.12.
43. Q.58, a. 1, ad 1.
44. ST I–II, qq. 90–105.
45. Q.90, a.1.
46. Q.90, a.1: “Unde relinquitur quod lex sit aliquid pertinens ad rationem.”
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sive end of all his/her actions, which he also defines here as the “common
good.”47 Anticipating questions of practical and especially political philoso-
phy, Aquinas further asserts that in principle “anybody’s reason” can partici-
pate in law’s directing of actions toward the common good by participating
in the making of laws.48 Later, however, Aquinas tends to assign the task of
legislation—the task assigned by modern constitutions to the legisla-
ture—to a “public personage” (persona publica) who “has care of the com-
munity”—the approximate equivalent of the modern executive. As is on the
whole customary for the laws of constitutional polities, Aquinas’s general
“law” of (practical) reason is also only able to take on binding force when
promulgated.49
The fact that the principle of determination by reason applies not only
to the positive laws of the respective political community, but also with
respect to the ethical underpinnings of action, is made clear by Aquinas in
the Quaestiones devoted to the characteristic features of “natural law.” Here,
Aquinas first refers to St. Augustine, whose Christian reinterpretation of the
Stoic lex naturalis doctrine he further develops such that he discovers here
for the very first time the principle of human moral autonomy. He joins
Augustine in adhering to a definition of “natural law” as the “impression of
divine light on us”50 and as the “sharing in the Eternal Law by intelligent
creatures.”51 Yet the significance of natural law becomes apparent by virtue
of its being defined as “the light of natural reason by which we discern what
is good and evil.”52 According to Aquinas, “natural law” contains the pri-
mary precept of practical reason. This is manifested as a principle whose
form must determine all further practical judgments. It is the apprehension
based on evidence of reason that: “good is to be sought and done, evil
avoided.”53 This principle contains only the form of a moral judgment, and
does not specify in any further detail what an agent might understand as
“good.” Since the “good” in the context of action needs to be understood
as the “end” of an act, the sought definition of what precisely can be
qualified as morally “good” and therefore “to be done” needs to be estab-
lished in light of a structural analysis of action, and the practical tendencies
of the human agent in question. On Aquinas’s view, these tendencies reveal
the individual subject to be in need of more precise definition in terms of
his/her concupiscence, that is, sensuality, as well as in terms of reason, the
power of speech, and membership of a community. Ludger Honnefelder
has correctly pointed out that the “natural inclinations” (inclinationes natu-
47. Q.90, a.2: “Et ideo omnis lex ad bonum commune ordinatur.”
48. Q.90, a.3.
49. Q.90, a.4.
50. Q.91, a.2: “impressio divini luminid in nobis.”
51. Q.91, a.2: “Lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in
rationali creatura.”
52. Q.91, a.2: “lumen rationis naturalis quo discernimus quid sit bonum et
malum.”
53. Q.94, a.2: “Bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum.”
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rales) such as the inclination to preserve the self and the species, to gain
understanding, and ultimately to gain knowledge of God, which Aquinas
here ascribes to practical human agency, merely demarcate “the frame-
work” for normative ethical reflection. While these natural inclinations
represent “a system of rules that is not arbitrary, but is of open design,” they
should not themselves be understood as norms.54 As we have already seen,
the norms directing action are not inherent in a human nature, but are
determined solely by practical human reason, that is, by an agent’s powers
of reason as applied to actions and their ends.
Aquinas deals with the virtue of justice in the context of his discussion
of “human law” (lex humana). In q.95, a.2, he appeals to the principles
already established by St. Augustine in De libero arbitrio that an unjust law is
no law. Augustine’s rationale consists in his very general requirement that,
for “laws” to be legitimate, they must participate in “justice”: “A command
has the force of law to the extent that it is just.”55 Aquinas develops these
ideas of Augustine’s, arguing that “human laws” can only be called “just”
from their being “right according to the rule of reason.”56 As we have
already seen, however, Aquinas defines as the first rule of reason affecting
actions “natural law,” which on the one hand contains the foremost, though
formal basic rule for all moral judgments, and on the other hand deter-
mines the framework within which in all generality the ends of actions
which can be qualified as “good” for the human agent can be determined.
As in the case of ethical decisions that are always based on concrete particu-
lar cases, in the case of positive laws too, no immediate directions or norms
for action can be directly inferred from “natural law.” These first of all have
to be derived from “natural law” through insight into the formal structure
of moral judgments and through understanding of the general structure of
human actions, in the context of the purview of state legislation.
Aquinas draws a general distinction between two modes of inference,
the modus conclusionis and the modus determinationis. He understands the
modus conclusionis as a deductive process of drawing logical, demonstrative
54. L. Honnefelder, “Naturrecht und Geschichte. Historisch-systematische
Überlegungen zum mittelalterlichen Naturrechtsdenken,” in Naturrecht im ethischen
Diskurs, ed. M. Heimbach-Steins (Munster/W: Aschendorff Verlag, 1990), p. 13. See
also Honnefelder, “Güterabwägung und Folgeabschätzung. Zur Bestimmung des
sittlich Guten bei Thomas von Aquin,” in Staat, Kirche, Wissenschaft in einer pluralistis-
chen Gesellschaft, ed. D. Schwab (Berlin: Duncker u. Humblot Verlag, 1989), and W.
Kluxen, Philosophische Ethik bei Thomas von Aquin (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1980).
55. Cf. Augustinus, De libero arbitrio, cap. 5, in: Patrologia Latina 32, 1227 B:
“Non videtur lex, quae iusta non fuerit.” On the reception of this principle of
Augustine’s by St. Thomas Aquinas, see inter alia Norman Kretzmann, “Lex Iniusta
Non Est Lex. Laws of Trial in Aquinas’ Court of Conscience,” The American Journal
of Jurisprudence 33 (1990): 99–122.
56. ST II–II, q. 95, a.2: “Unde inquantum habet de iustitia, intantum habet de
virtute legis. In rebus autem humanis dicitur esse aliquid justum ex eo quod est
rectum secundrum regulam rationis.”
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conclusions from theoretical premises as in the theoretical sciences (the
scientiae). He applies the term modus determinationis to the process custom-
arily practiced in the arts (the artes). The arts do not offer proof, but
concretize a general idea or form initially conceived as a rough outline,
giving it “special shape,” as when an architect determines that a house
should be built in this or that particular style, thus concretizing an initially
abstract design. In so doing, the architect supplements the initial prescrip-
tions by further developing the initial ones in an innovative fashion, thus
transforming them into their concrete shape as intended at the outset.
According to Aquinas, both modes of inference can be seen at work in the
relationship which in his view exists between the “natural law” of practical
reason, and human (positive) law: A “just law” derives its normative force
by virtue of its being right according to the compelling inference drawn by
practical reason from “natural law,” which according to Aquinas is a judg-
ment arrived at per modum conclusionis.57 The provisions of the “law of
nations” (ius gentium) are also, according to Aquinas, derived from premises
of “natural law” on a basis analogous to the deduction of scientific results
from scientific premises; the law of nations in Aquinas’s view comprises all
that which does not proceed from the conclusion of covenants or positive
legislation. He also includes in that the principle of just exchange “and so
forth, without which men cannot live sociably together,” also deliberated on
in ST II–II, q.58.58 But all constructions derived per modum determinationis
from “natural law” are in Aquinas’s view proper to civil law (ius civile):
“ . . . and here each political community decides for itself what is fitting.”59
Assuming that the political community in question is guided by the general
virtue of justice, then that community is directed toward the end of the
bonum commune, the latter only a general outline. Then, and only then, can
the claim of legitimacy be raised for the positive laws flowing from that.
Aquinas speaks of a “just law” in this context. Yet which law serves the
common good to a greater or lesser extent in any given case is a particular
question which can only be answered in light of the concrete circumstances,
giving due consideration to possible alternative options.60 In Aquinas’s view,
this process of formulating new laws can only be guided appropriately by an
individual who is him- or herself in possession of the general virtue of
justice, thus guaranteeing that individual’s orientation towards the end of
the common good. Yet the individual in question must also be in possession
57. ST II–II, “In rebus autem humanis dicitur esse aliquid justum ex eo quod
est rectum secundum regulam rationis.”
58. ST II–II, q.95, a.4.
59. ST II–II, “ius civile secundum quod quaelibet civitas aliquid sibi accom-
modum determinat.”
60. Cf. ST II–II, q.96, a.l, “Hence human laws should be proportionate to the
common good. Now the common good comprises many things. Wherefore law
should take account of many things, as to persons, as to occupations, as to times,
because the political community is composed of many citizens and its good is
procured by many actions nor is it established to endure for only a short time.”
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of expert jurisprudential knowledge, since the task in hand is not to apply
existing laws to particular circumstances as in the case of judicial decisions
and precedents, but to further develop existing laws or replace them with
new ones. This activity too must still be considered an inference drawn by
practical reason per modum determinationis. From a normative perspective,
however, what is crucial to the success of this process of derivation is that
the agents participating in it are directed toward the common good
through possession of the general virtue of justice.
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